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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

At page five through eight of the Appellant's Opening Brief, the appellant explains in detail the
appellant's version of the history of this case. However, the appellant fails to ever cite to the record
on appeal for support of the statements made at pages five through eight. Therefore, the respondent
does not have sufficient notice to respond to the statements made at pages five through eight of
the Appellant's Opening Brief. The respondent objects to the entirety of statements made at pages
five through eight as unsupported and irrelevant to the issue on appeal of attorney's fees. The
respondent's relevant statement of facts, which is supported by the record, is provided below.

On December 13, 2013, a Complaint was filed with the trial court naming the plaintiff as "Victoria
H. Smith, by and through her attorney in fact, Vernon K. Smith, by and through his Durable and
Irrevocable Power of Attorney" ("deceased" hereafter) and naming the defendants as "Treasure
Valley Seed Company, LLC, and Don Tolmie in his individual capacity, and as an owner,
representative and authorized agent of Treasure Valley Seed Co., LLC" ("TVC" hereafter). R. p.
5-14. During a telephone conference on March 3, 2014, the trial court and counsel for TVC learned
that the deceased had died on September 11, 2013, three months before the Complaint was filed.

On March 18, 2014, TVC filed a motion and memorandum to dismiss the Complaint on the
grounds that the deceased had died three months before the Complaint was filed. R. p. 143-153.
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On April 2, 2014, a hearing was held on the motion to dismiss and the Complaint was dismissed.
Thereafter, TV C filed a memorandum of costs seeking an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant
to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 & 12-121 and IRCP 54(e)(l) & 1l(a)(l). R. p. 167-168. On July 28,
2014, a hearing was held on TVC's memorandum of costs wherein the trial court ruled, in part, as
follows:
[I]t is clear to me that the defendant in this case is the prevailing party. This
Court does, in fact, have jurisdiction ....
So I do have jurisdiction, and the defendant is clearly the prevailing party.
The determination or [sic] prevailing party is generally held to be a discretionary
call with the Court based upon the facts and circumstances of the case, but that
discretion is not unbounded. And there is a case I can't cite it off the top of my
head but there is a case that says a Court abuses its discretion when it declines to
find a defendant is the prevailing party where the defendant has obtained the most
relief the defendant could get, and that is dismissal of the case.
So in this case, were I to hold there is no prevailing party, I believe the Idaho
Supreme Court would say that I had abused my discretion. So there is a prevailing
party.
And, frankly, I think attorney's fees are awardable, would be awardable on
this case under all three theories put forth. It has its origins in a commercial
transaction; that is, looking at the pleadings in the case, underlying it is a dispute
over the storage of beans. So the origin of the dispute is in a commercial transaction
as contrasted to being a tort or a being a consumer transaction; that is, a transaction
related to or a transaction for personal or household purposes.
But more fundamentally this is a case that should never have been brought
in the fashion that it was brought. It was not brought by the proper party. Victoria
Smith is no longer with us. She cannot in-person or through a power of attorney be
a party to a court action. It's just pretty much that simple and black letter law. This
matter, if it is to be pursued on behalf of Victoria Smith upon her passing, it needs
to be pursued by the estate of Victoria Smith. And that was never commenced, at
least not as of the time this case was brought. And at the time is was argued, Mr.
Eismann represents that it has not been - probate has not been started to this date.
I don't know. That's not in my record. I don't rely on that. I look at the case as it
was at the time it was terminated - or actually at the time it was commenced.
This case was brought without foundation. Idaho Code Section 12-121 says
that attorney's fees are awardable if the case is brought, pursued, or defended
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. I won't go as far as to say the case
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is frivolous because underlying it there appears to be a genuine dispute of some
variety that needs to be decided at some point by a proper forum or in a proper
forum. But it was certainly pursued in this case without foundation because there
is no foundation for commencing a lawsuit on behalf of someone who is deceased
other than doing it through the - as a properly-appointed personal representative or
otherwise authorized person. And a power of attorney simply does not and cannot
survive the death of the grantor. That's just so fundamental that it is hard to find
even authority that says so.
I will award the attorney's fees. The costs requested are all costs as a matter
of right. The attorney's fees requested -- or the costs requested will be awarded.
And I'm going to award attorney's fees in this case under Idaho Code Section 12121 as a lawsuit that was brought or pursued without foundation -- umeasonably
and without foundation.
As an alternative I would award attorney's fees under 12-120(3), although
I do not think that reaches to counsel. I am not comfortable that the procedure
required by Rule 11, that is, the opportunity -- the notice and opportunity to
withdraw a pleading and get out from under the potential sanction was followed in
this case. Or if it was and my record was clear that it was followed, so at this time
I'm going to decline to award fees under Rule 11. But I will rule -- award them
under 12-121 against the party and counsel because it's counsel's responsibility,
frankly, in a case like this to know the law and follow it.
Tr. Vol. I, p. 31 L. 15 - p. 36, L. 8

On August 28, 2014, a Judgment was entered on TVC's memorandum of costs. Counsel for TVC
prepared and submitted the Judgment and the trial court struck out several of the provisions in the
Judgment. The only provision left in the Judgment provided as follows:
4.
The defendants shall recover from Attorney Vernon K. Smith and the
plaintiff,jointly and severly, the costs and attorney fees of $15,826.50 which sum
shall bear interest from the date of this judgment until paid at the judgment rate
fixed by Idaho Code Section 28-22-104(2) which on the date of this judgment is
5 .125 percent per annum.
R. p. 200.
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On October 8, 2014, the deceased filed a Notice of Appeal. On October 23, 2014, TVC
filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal.
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

TVC presents no additional issues on appeal.
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ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

TVC requests an award of attorney's fees against on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 and
IRCP 54(e)(l). TVC requests that counsel for the deceased be liable for the attorney's fees.

Under Idaho Code § 12-121 and IRCP 54(e)(l), TVC requests attorney's fees as the prevailing
party because the deceased's appeal is frivolous, umeasonable, and without foundation as
explained at length below.
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ARGUMENT
1.

Standard of review.

The standard ofreview for an award of attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 12-120, Idaho Code §
12-121, and IRCP 1 l(a)(l) is the abuse of discretion standard. See Sims v. Jacobson, 157 Idaho
980, 342 P.3d 907, 911 (2014), Idaho Military Historical Society, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624,
629, 329 P.3d 1072 (2013), and Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho
87, 94, 803 P.2d 993 (1990) respectively.

The abuse of discretion standard is a three step analysis as follows:
(1) whether the trial court properly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether that court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether
the court reached its decision by the exercise of reason.

Maslen at 629.

2.

The trial court properly awarded attorney's fees to TVC pursuant to Idaho Code§

12-121.

The trial court properly perceived the issue of an award of attorney's fees as one of discretion. The
trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with all legal
standards. The trial court reached its decision by the exercise of reason.
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The deceased raises several arguments against the trial court's award of attorney's fees to TVC
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. Those arguments are addressed individually below.

A.

Whether written findings were required for attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code

§ 12-121.

The first argument of the deceased is that the trial court failed to provide written findings
supporting its award of attorney's fees to TV C pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121, which provides
that "[w]henever the court awards attorney fees pursuant to section 12-121, Idaho Code, it shall
make a written finding, either in the award or in a separate document, as to the basis and reasons
for awarding such attorney fees." Thus, TVC must admit that written findings are required for an
award of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121.

TVC requests on appeal the creation of new case law allowing an exception to the written findings
requirement of IRCP 54(e)(2) where it is clear from the record the basis on which the trial court
awarded attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121. The proposed new rule and/or exception
would be that the written findings requirement of IRCP 54(e)(2) is met where the trial court's
findings are clear from the transcript of a hearing on a memorandum of costs. If the trial court's
findings are not clear from the transcript of a hearing on a memorandum of costs, then the issue
must be remanded to the trial court. The reason for t~e creation of new law is to avoid unnecessary
waste of judicial time and energy in remanding an issue to the trial court.
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In this case, the trial court extensively explained at oral argument on the memorandum of costs
what the trial court found in relation to awarding attorney's fees to TVC pursuant to Idaho Code §
12-121. The trial court specifically found that "I'm going to award attorney's fees in this case
under Idaho Code Section 12-121 as a lawsuit that was brought or pursued without foundation -unreasonably and without foundation." Tr. Vol I, p. 35, L. 15-19. The trial court spent a
considerable amount of time explaining why this lawsuit was unreasonable and without foundation
during other parts of the hearing as shown in the trial court's decision in the statement of facts
section above. There appears to be no reasonable cause to remand the issue to the trial court to
enter written findings pursuant to IRCP 54(e)(2) when it is readily apparent what the findings of
the trial court were in awarding attorney's fees to TVC.

If, on appeal, it is determined that IRCP 54(e)(2) is mandatory and no exception will be made
thereto, then TVC asks that the case be remanded to the trial court for entry of written findings as
to the basis and reasons for awarding attorney's fees to TVC pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121.
Idaho appellate court have held that where there are no written findings pursuant to IRCP 54(e)(2),
then the case should be remanded to the trial court for the entry of written findings. See Snipes v.

Schalo, 130 Idaho 890, 893, 950 P.2d 262 (Ct.App.1997) and Needs v. Idaho State Dept. of
Correction at Orofino, 115 Idaho 399,401, 766 P.2d 1280 (Ct.App.1988).
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B.

Whether a person's misperception of law or of one's interest under the law, by itself,

is unreasonable conduct pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121.

The second argument of the deceased is that a misperception of the law or an interest under the
law, by itself, is not umeasonable conduct. The quirk in this issue is that Idaho case law does not
specify whose perception is at issue - i.e. is it the party's perception or the perception of the
attorney representing the party. That issue is particularly in play in this case because the issue of
the deceased's perception of the law cannot be discussed because the deceased was dead when the
Complaint was filed. Therefore, the deceased could not have misperceived anything.

The only person left to misperceive anything at the time of filing the Complaint is opposing
counsel, Vernon K. Smith ("Mr. Smith" hereafter). Since a misperception of law or an interest
under the law, by itself, does not automatically rise to the level of unreasonable conduct, then the
entire circumstance must be taken into consideration. Thus, the analysis in this case is whether Mr.
Smith's misperception of the law or an interest under the law was unreasonable considering all of
the circumstances surrounding this case.

Mr. Smith's misperception of the law was unreasonable and without foundation. At the trial court
level, Mr. Smith filed the Complaint under the theory that he had a durable and irrevocable power
of attorney for the deceased which allowed him to act on behalf of the deceased. However, this
argument defies the facts and the law.

DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS/CROSS-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

PAGE 13

Mr. Smith has taken several positions regarding the assets of the deceased and ownership of those
assets. The Complaint initially showed that Mr. Smith thought he could act on the deceased' s
behalf by way of the durable power of attorney. Then Mr. Smith argued to the trial court that he
was the only heir of the deceased pursuant to a will. Tr. Vol. I, p. 12, L. 3 - p. 14, L. 3. Now, at
page 8 of the deceased's opening brief on appeal, Mr. Smith admits that all of the deceased's assets
had been previously transfe1Ted to an entity called VHS Properties, LLC. Moreover, a probate
action has now been filed wherein the will is being challenged by Mr. Smith's brother, Joseph H.
Smith (one of two of Mr. Smith's siblings), on the grounds that the will is the product of undue
influence by Mr. Smith. TVC asks the appellate court to take judicial notice of probate case CVIE-2014-15352 in Ada County. Thus, Mr. Smith's original position in filing the Complaint under
the theory of a durable power of attorney is simply not factual because Mr. Smith has taken so
many contrary positions.

Mr. Smith's position in filing the Complaint under the theory that he had a durable power of
attorney over the deceased also defies clear law. As explained by TVC in the Defendant's
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Smith's power of attorney terminated when
the deceased died. R. p. 152. Under Idaho Code 15-12-1 lO(l)(a), a power of attorney terminated
when the principle dies. Thus, when the deceased died on September 11, 2013, Mr. Smith's power
of attorney terminated. However, Mr. Smith continued attempting to exercise the authority of the
power of attorney when he filed the Complaint on December 13, 2013.
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Given Mr. Smith's inaccurate factual allegations and his clearly unlawful use of a power of
attorney after the deceased died, Mr. Smith's conduct can only be seen as unreasonable. Mr. Smith
cannot credibly argue that he misperceived the facts and the law. Consequently, Mr. Smith cannot
credibly claim that his conduct was reasonable as a simple misperception of law or an interest
under the law.

Aside from Mr. Smith's subjective view of whether his conduct was umeasonable, the trial court
specifically found that Mr. Smith brought or pursued this lawsuit unreasonably and without
foundation. The Idaho Supreme Court explained the analysis for an award of attorney's fees
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 as follows:
An award of attorney fees pursuant to I. C. § 12-121 and LR. C.P. 54(e)(1) will not
be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See Savage Lateral Ditch Water Users
Ass'n v. Pulley, 125 Idaho 237,250, 869 P.2d 554, 567 (1993). The district court's
determination as to whether an action was brought or defended frivolously will not
be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.

Maslen at 629.

If a trial court's decision as to whether an action was brought frivolously will not be disturbed
absent an abuse of discretion, then the same abuse of discretion standard should apply to whether
an action was brought unreasonably or without foundation. Thus, when the trial court found that
the deceased's lawsuit was brought unreasonably and without foundation, then that determination
should only be overturned on appeal if the deceased shows the trial court abused his discretion.
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The deceased has failed to state how the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the
deceased's case was brought unreasonable and without foundation.

C.

Whether the entire course of litigation must be considered in an award of attorney's

fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 so that any legitimate, triable issue of fact will prevent
an award of attorney's fees.

The deceased' s argument on this issue is difficult to ascertain. The deceased provides case law that
the any legitimate triable issue will negate an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §
12-121, but the deceased never explains or identifies how the deceased presented a triable issue of
fact. Regardless, the deceased's legal theory fails for two reasons.

First, the Idaho Supreme Court has recently modified the strict rule that any triable issue of fact
will prevent an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121. In Maslen, the Idaho
Supreme Court explained as follows:
Unfortunately, the standard articulated in Nampa Meridian can lead to the result
that a party who makes claims or defenses that are clearly frivolous, unreasonable,
or without foundation may avoid the consequences of that conduct and cast the
burden of attorney fees on the other party, even if the overall view of the case
establishes the unreasonableness of the conduct requiring the lawsuit. Arguably, a
single, triable issue of fact may excuse a party from the aggregate of misconduct
that necessitates or dominates the conduct of the lawsuit. This Court does back
away from and clarify the overly strict application of Idaho Code section 12-121 set
forth in Nampa Meridian. Apportionment of attorney fees is appropriate for those
elements of the case that were frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation.
Apportionment of costs and fees is common even for district courts, and this step
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back from the language of Nampa J\1eridian is consistent with the general
principles of apportioning costs and fees.

Id. at 632.
Thus, Idaho case law no longer holds that any triable or legitimate issue of fact will prevent the
award of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and the deceased' s legal theory fails.

Second, even ifldaho case law still held that a legitimate triable issue of fact will prevent an award
of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121, the deceased failed to provide such legitimate
triable issue of fact. The deceased filed the Complaint in the name of the deceased, which cannot
be done. The deceased refuses to acknowledge that fatal error and instead asks this court to
consider that the deceased should have been allowed to substitute in a different party. Despite the
fact that the deceased failed to timely appeal that issue, the deceased continues to argue the issue
of whether a substitution of parties should have been allowed by the trial court.

On December 10, 2015, an order was entered in this case on appeal wherein the deceased was
ordered to "file a revised brief that addresses the issue of fees only." Despite that order, the
deceased continues to try to argue the issue of whether the trial court should have dismissed the
Complaint. TVC objects to the deceased's continuation on this argument, but will address the issue
regardless.
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The trial court properly dismissed the deceased's Complaint. At the hearing on the motion to
dismiss on April 2, 2014, the trial court discussed the problem with allowing the deceased to
substitute another party-that it is unknown who would actually have the right to collect from
TVC ifTVC was unsuccessful at trial. The trial court stated, "[a]nd Mr. Eismann's client is to run
the risk -- I mean, if they -- if they actually owe money and pay it to the wrong person, they can
be made to pay twice." Tr. Vol. I, p. 12, L. 21-24. The trial court also acknowledged that no probate
had been filed for the deceased. In essence, the trial court was unwilling to wait around to find out
who could be owed money by TVC.

The trial court's decision to not allow substitution is especially sound considering that any number
of people and/or entities could ultimately be entitled to be paid. As explained above, the potential
parties with an interest in the proceeds (if any) of this case could be the deceased's estate, Mr.
Smith, Mr. Smith's two siblings, or VHS Properties, LLC. It would have been extremely
prejudicial to TVC to either wait around for conclusion of the deceased's estate or to pay one of
the potential recipients and hope that TVC would not be required to pay a second time.

The trial court properly considered the entire course of litigation and came to the conclusion that
the deceased's case was unreasonable and without foundation. The deceased has shown no abuse
of discretion on the part of the trial court and the trial court's grant of attorney's fees to TVC
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 should be upheld.
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3.

TVC withdraws its cross-appeal.

TV C filed a cross-appeal in this action seeking recovery of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code
12-120(3) and IRCP ll(a)(l), but TVC hereby withdraws that cross-appeal. The reason for the
withdrawal is that an award of attorney's fees against the deceased would be useless at this point.
TVC was not made aware of the filing of an estate for the deceased and thereby TVC did not file
a claim for attorney's fees against the estate of the deceased. The time within which to make a
claim against the estate of the deceased has run, so TVC will not pursue an award of attorney's
fees against the estate. Moreover, depending on the outcome of litigation in the estate of the
deceased, there may be no assets to pay any potential award of attorney's fees.

The deceased has not as of yet had to respond to the cross-appeal. Thus, there is no prejudice to
the deceased in the withdrawal of the cross-appeal.

CONCLUSION

The trial comi's award of attorney's fees should be upheld. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion is awarding attorney's fees to TVC and making both the deceased and counsel for the
deceased jointly and severally liable for those attorney's fees. The trial court properly perceived
the issue of attorney's fees as one of discretion. The trial court acted within the outer boundaries
of its discretion and consistently with all legal standards applicable to specific choices. The trial
court reached its decision by the exercise of reason.
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SERVICE BY MAIL: The undersigned hereby certifies that two true bound copies hereof were
this day mailed by U. S. Mail, postage prepaid to: Vernon K. Smith, Attorney at Law, at 1900
West Main Street, Boise, ID 83702.
DATED:

JAN 2 1 2016

SIGNED:
Counsel for the defendants/respondents/cross-appellants
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